Uztaro

Arrazoimenak bere buruari ezin erantzun dizkion galderak behin eta berriro jartzea eta jartzeari ezin uztea, arazo etengabea da Kanten obra osoan, prekritikotik kritikora eta hilostekora. Entseiatu izan dituen paradoxaren azalpide ezberdinen artean, agian argitsuena problema hori orientazio-arazo gisa planteatu duena da: espazioan fisikoki orientatzen jakiteko lehen erreferentzia norbere gorputzezkotasuna den bezala, espekulazioan bere “beharrak” ditu arrazoimenak metafisikoki orientatzeko funtsezko erreferentzia eta irizpide. Hau da, espekulazioan esperientziak ezin gidatu duen arrazoimena, bere beharrak egin lezake. Beharra, adiera honetan (Bedürfniss der Vernunft), arrazoimenaren fedearekin berdintzen da, zeinak ez duen ordea zerikusirik arrazoizko fedearekin (vernünftiger Glaube vs. Vernunftglaube), gaztelaniaz ohizko itzulpenak nahaski pentsarazten duenaren aurka.

 

The subject of reason, pursued by questions which it can not solve, is spreaded all over the work of Kant; and this is, precisely, Kant’s most confronted point with the Berliner Illustration, particularly with Mendelssohn. With no relation with experience, reason needs a guide for speculation, for which (historical) Revelation can not serve. While for Kant, the only guide for reason is its own internal necessity (Bedürfniss der Vernunft), for Mendelssohn (after a late recognition of reason’s perplexity), this roll is assumed by the common sense. From both positionings derives an important difference, which, in fact, is an opposition for Kant, between reasonable faith and faith of reason (vernünftiger Glaube vs. Vernunftglaube). This difference is often confused within texts and translations in latin languages. In the necessity for reason, theoretical reason and practical reason go linked.